Intimations of Immortality: The Ethics and Justice of Life Extending Therapies by John Harris
INTERNATIONAL
LONGEVITY CENTER–USA
An Affiliate of Mount Sinai School of Medicine
The Harold Hatch International Lecture
on Longevity and Population Aging
2002
Intimations of
Immortality
The Ethics
and Justice of
Life-Extending
Therapies
John Harris
The Harold Hatch International Lecture
on Longevity and Population Aging
Intimations of
Immortality
The Ethics and Justice of
Life-Extending Therapies
John Harris
September 24, 2002
Hatch Auditorium, Guggenheim Pavilion
Mount Sinai Medical Center
Sponsored by
The International Longevity Center-USA
Brookdale Department of Geriatrics and Adult Development
of Mount Sinai School of Medicine
The International Longevity Center-USA (ILC-USA)
is a not-for-profit, nonpartisan research, education, and
policy organization whose mission is to help individuals
and societies address longevity and population aging in
positive and productive ways, and to highlight older
people’s productivity and contributions to their families
and society as a whole.
The organization is part of a multinational research and
education consortium and includes centers in the United
States, Japan, Great Britain, France, the Dominican Republic,
India, South Africa, Argentina, and the Netherlands. These
centers work both autonomously and collaboratively to
study how greater life expectancy and increased proportions
of older people impact nations around the world.
Copyright © 2002 John Harris
Published by International Longevity Center-USA, Ltd.
JohnHarris,
F.Med.Sci., B.A.,D.Phil.
Dr. John Harris was educated at the University of Kent and at
Balliol College, Oxford.
He is a member of the United Kingdom Human Genetics
Commission and of the Ethics Committee of the British Med-
ical Association. Dr. Harris was elected a fellow of the United
Kingdom Academy of Medical Sciences in 2001, the first
philosopher chosen to join this elite group of medical scientists.
Dr. Harris was a founding director of the International Asso-
ciation of Bioethics, a founding member of the board of the
journal Bioethics, and a member of many other journals,
including the Journal of Medical Ethics. He is the series editor
of Social Ethics and Policy, published by Routledge, and is the
founder and a general editor of a major series of books, enti-
tled Issues in Biomedical Ethics, for Oxford University Press.
In 1994, Dr. Harris was elected a member of the Romanian
Academy of Medical Sciences. He was a member of the United
Kingdom Government Advisory Committee on Genetic Test-
ing from 1996 to 1999. Over the last five years, Dr. Harris has
directed four major projects for the European Commission
under the Biomedical and Health Research Programme
(DG XII). He also serves as director of EUROSTEM, a major
project funded by the European Commission to investigate and
monitor ethics and policy issues surrounding the progress of
human stem cell research.
Intimations of Immortality: The Ethics and Justice of Life-ExtendingTherapies i
This lecture is based on a paper, “Intimations of Immortality—The ethics
and justice of life-extending therapies,” by John Harris, in Michael
Freeman, ed.,Current Legal Problems, Oxford University Press, 2002.
We are all programmed to age and die, but maybe it doesn’t
have to be that way.1 If cells weren’t programmed to age, if
the telomeres, which govern the number of times a cell may
divide, didn’t shorten with each division,2 if our bodies could
repair damage due to disease and aging “from within,”3 we
would certainly live much longer and healthier lives. From all
over the world, research is being reported, which, if it comes
to fruition, would not only constitute major contributions to
the treatment of disease but could in principle lead to the
indefinite extension of life, to the extent perhaps that we
would begin to think of people who had received such life-
extending treatment as “immortals.”4
Cloned human embryonic stem cells (ES cells), appropriately
reprogrammed, might be made to colonize particular tissue
and organs, triggering constant regeneration.5 Precise combi-
nations of growth factors injected directly into muscle or
tissue might put the body into a state of constant renewal.
If we can discover all the genes that trigger the aging process
and switch them off in the early embryo, we could then, in
Lee Silver’s words, “write immortality into the genes of the
human race.”6
I. PRESENTAND FUTURE IMMORTALS
Before trying to imagine the ethical and social consequences
of our being able to write immortality into the genes of
the human race, we need to think for a moment about the
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and of course we may never reach the destination. In the
remainder of this discussion I shall talk predominantly of
“immortality” and “immortals” and mean these terms to cover
all stages from quite modest life-extending therapies to truly
indefinite survival.
If we assume that life extension will be possible, and that peo-
ple who will for practical purposes be “immortals” might be
created, it is of some importance to know what we should
think about such a prospect and what should, or could, we do
about it. It is important to press this question for a number of
reasons. The first is perhaps the intrinsic interest and signifi-
cance of the question. Humans have up to now been defined
in terms of their mortality.We mortals have seen this as part
of our essential nature. Moreover, extending lifespan is far
from unproblematically beneficial, and there are questions
of justice, of social policy, and of sheer practicality to be
resolved. Although the development of this technology may
be far in the future, there is some considerable importance to
addressing the moral and social issues raised by new tech-
nologies in advance of their development. There are many
good reasons for this. Once a technology has been developed
it acquires its own momentum and may be very difficult
to stop or control. Equally, fears that are provoked in the
panic that may follow dramatic developments may prove
unfounded, and acting precipitately on those fears may cut us
off from real and substantial benefits. This has, for example,
clearly been true in the case of the reaction to the develop-
ment of cloning technology.7 “Horizon scanning” is not sim-
ply voyeuristic; it can enable us to choose the futures that we
want to experience and to prepare sensibly for those futures.
Or it can forearm us against futures that, while undesired,
are not such as we can legitimately or realistically prevent.
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difference between trying to make existing people immortal
and engineering immortality into future generations. If we
tried to make existing people, you and me, immortal, we
would have to make each cell that might be terminally dam-
aged capable of regeneration. This would be a very compre-
hensive task, but there are various ways in which, in principle,
it might be achieved. One strategy might be to attempt to put
into the bloodstream many differently programmed ES cells
that had targeting molecules attached that would cause them
to colonize the different bodily systems that might be affected
by disease—brain, cardiovascular system, and so on. Since no
technology is 100 percent effective, repeated interventions
would probably be necessary, but it might be possible in this
way to extend existing lives indefinitely.
In the long term it may be possible to “switch off ” the
aging process and also to maintain a repair program in cells,
by modifying the cells of the early embryo or even in the
gametes prior to conception. If all the cells of an individual
had their aging program switched off and were programmed
to regenerate, then the immortality that this would confer
on the cells would be passed on as the cells multiplied and
differentiated, eventually affecting every cell in the body as it
was formed. The resulting children would be truly immortal.
There is a long road between therapies that will result in
extending life expectancy and the heady prospect of “writing
immortality into the genes of the human race.” It seems
safest to assume that we are likely to start with targeted
therapies for particular conditions, which, because they
involve tissue or cell regeneration, will result in longer life
expectancy. Later we may learn how to combine such meas-
ures with the ability to switch off the aging process in genes.
The road to immortality will be long and progress slow,
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To begin with it was fun, he had a ball, living danger-
ously, taking risks, cleaning up on high-yield long-term
investments, and just generally outliving the hell out
of everybody.
In the end it was the Sunday afternoons that he couldn’t
cope with, and that terrible listlessness which starts to set
in at about 2:55 when you know that you have had all the
baths you can usefully have that day, that however hard
you stare at any given paragraph in the newspapers you
will never actually read it … and that as you stare at the
clock the hands will move relentlessly on to four o’clock,
and you will enter the long dark teatime of the soul.8
Despite the apparent pessimism of this passage many people
would be prepared to endure “the long dark teatime of the
soul” in exchange for permanent remission of the death sen-
tence under which we all are currently forced to live.9 Indeed
there is much evidence both from literature and in the litera-
ture that suggests that many people are willing to trade off
quality of life for longevity.10 From the pact of Faust, cele-
brated by writers from Marlow to Goethe, to Bram Stoker’s
vampires,11 to choices made by cancer patients with a termi-
nal diagnosis,12 the evidence is strong that people want extra
lifetime even at substantial costs in terms of pain and quality
of life, and even when outcomes are highly uncertain.
Immortality Is Not Invulnerability
We should note that immortality is not the same as invulner-
ability, and even “immortals” could die or be killed. Accidents,
infectious diseases, wars and domestic violence would all take
their toll; and although we might hope for progress in com-
bating existing diseases, the development of new threats, as
the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the emergence of variant
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I believe that this latter “option” will prove to be the case for
life-extending techniques, and that it is therefore important
to think carefully about their consequences rather than delude
ourselves that we can choose whether or not the technology
will become available.
There is, of course, a sense in which we are all already immor-
tal. We know that genes are “immortal.” The genes in each
of us come from our earliest humanoid ancestors, and their
genes came from the earliest forms of life on earth. The genes
we pass on to the next generation, by whatever method of
reproduction we use, may survive indefinitely into the future.
This is certainly immortality of a kind. Those who find the
thought of such immortality attractive can comfort them-
selves with the thought that their genes have always been
immortal in this sense. If this sort of immortality answers the
quest, then parts of each and every one of us are immortal
and always have been. But, of course, it doesn’t. The quest
is for personal immortality, and if and when that can be
achieved many people’s individual prayers will have been
answered, but humanity will face huge challenges.
Familiarity with Immortals
Increased longevity and its logical extension, some would say
its reductio ad absurdum, immortality, have a long history.
Certainly the human imagination is familiar with the idea
of immortals and mortals living alongside one another and
interacting. The Iliad, The Odyssey, the Bible, the Koran, the
Ramayana and Shakespeare’s plays have all made such ideas
familiar; even modern classics have taken seriously the possi-
bility of immortality. In his celebrated five-part trilogy, The
Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, Douglas Adams imagines a
man who achieved immortality by accident.
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developed superhuman skills would be an interesting ques-
tion. Although since there is probably an upper limit to useful
road skills, and traffic congestion would be a limiting factor, it
is likely that immense experience would not add much to
road safety.
We do not know when, or even if, such technologies could be
developed and made safe enough to use. It might happen in
ten, or a thousand years, or never, but many reputable scien-
tists believe it to be possible.14 Of course it is also possible
that even the substantial degree of residual vulnerability we
have discussed could eventually be dramatically modified by
techniques that might be developed that would enable a cer-
tain amount of repair and even rebuilding work to be under-
taken on badly damaged or destroyed tissue. If progress were
to be made in this direction, not only might generational
replacement slow still further but average life expectancy of
say 1,200 years might have to be revised substantially upward.
Global Justice
One thing we do know is that the technology required to
produce such results will be expensive. For existing people
with multiple interventions probably required, the costs will
be substantial. To make modifications to the embryo or even
to the gametes prior to conception, people will have to be
determinedly circumspect about procreation and will probably
need to use reproductive technologies to have their immortal
children. Even in technologically advanced countries, there-
fore, immortality or increased life expectancy is likely to be
confined to a minority of the population. In global terms the
divide between high-income and low-income countries will
be increased with low-income countries effectively denied
access to the technology that might make some of their citi-
zens immortal. The issue of the citizens of rich countries
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Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease have demonstrated, may increase
rather than reduce human vulnerability over time. If we add
to this the diminishing effect of proven therapies such as
antibiotics through the emergence of resistant strains of bac-
teria, it is difficult to predict the likely levels of “premature”
deaths in a future in which increased life expectancy was
developing and spreading through the human population.
Human generations would undoubtedly still succeed one
another although possibly at a slower rate.
II. LONG LIFE GOOD, SHORT LIFE BETTER?
How should we view the prospect of “writing immortality
into the genes of the human race” or even of the significant
extension of individual lives, both for ourselves, for others,
and for society? This is a question that is both of immense
interest and, as we shall see, of considerable ethical, social,
and practical importance.
Life Expectancy of 1,200Years?
Steven Austad13 has calculated that an average life expectancy
for “immortals” might be 1,200 years. This he bases on the
supposition that immortals might die at the rate of current
11-year-olds. The idea is that 11-year-olds have stopped
dying of childhood diseases and have not yet started dying of
the diseases of old age. Extrapolating from the death rate of
11-year-olds thus gives a possible death rate for immortal but
vulnerable adults. He raises an interesting question in connec-
tion with attitudes to risk. It is unclear what the effects on
levels of risk aversion would be. It might be a safe bet that
young males in particular would remain in high premium
brackets for motor insurance but whether or not “supercen-
tenarian” citizens would be a menace on the roads or would
have, perhaps through constant practice over a longish period,
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patients unless and until we can provide them for all with
renal failure.We do however have a clear ethical responsibil-
ity to ensure that the question of who receives the treatments
should be decided according to some just principle of
distribution.
But the “impossibility” of providing treatments for all admits
of many different degrees.We don’t usually regard ourselves
as wicked in Europe because we perform many transplants16
while low-income countries perform few or none at all, but
perhaps we should. The solution however is certainly not to
say that we will outlaw transplantation unless and until equi-
table distribution on some agreed principles can be guaran-
teed. The introduction of any new complex and/or expensive
technology raises these problems. The impact on global jus-
tice or on justice within societies is important and must be
addressed; it is a principled objection, but not an objection
in principle to the introduction of life extending therapies.
The principle requires that strenuous and realistic efforts be
made to provide the benefits of the technology justly, not that
the benefits be denied because of the impossibility of ensur-
ing adequate justice of provision.
On the supposition that longevity is a good, there will be
both personal and global injustice. However the principle of
“no dogs in mangers” will probably be enough to stop any
comprehensive prohibition of the use of life-extending treat-
ments on grounds of a general policy denying palpable bene-
fits to some so long as others cannot equally benefit. On the
other hand if longevity neither confers advantages nor is
desirable, then it is difficult to see how it might be unjust or
wrongful for some to receive such “neutral” treatments but
not others.
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gaining further advantages over the poor will rightly disturb
many. Indeed, the major ethical problem with life-extending
technologies is, I believe, to be seen in terms of justice. How
are we to understand the demands of justice here?
Parallel populations
One feature of likely development of life-extending treat-
ments, which has seldom been noticed, is the fact that as
treatments become available we will face the prospect of par-
allel populations, of mortals and of immortals existing along-
side one another.15 Thus the problems of global justice will be
repeated in those societies able to implement life-extending
therapies. Just as there will exist parallel societies, some able
to provide immortalizing therapies and some not, so within
those societies that have the technology and the resources
required there will exist parallel populations of mortals and
immortals. This, of course, is precisely the destiny for which
the poetic imagination has prepared us, literally from “time
immemorial.”While such parallel populations seem inher-
ently undesirable, it is not clear that we could, or even that
we should, do anything about such a prospect for reasons of
justice. For if immortality or increased life expectancy is a
good thing, it is doubtful ethics to deny goods to some people
because we cannot provide them for all. And this unfairness
is not simply contingent, a function of a regrettable but in
principle removable lack of resources. There will always be
circumstances in which we cannot prevent harms or do good
to everyone, but no one surely thinks that this affords us a
reason to decline to prevent harms to anyone in particular.
If twins suffer from cancer and one is incurable and the other
not, we do not conclude that we should not treat the curable
cancer because this would in some sense be unjust to the
incurable twin.We don’t refuse kidney transplants to some
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suffering from treatable disease the chance of a cure on the
grounds that the therapy brought the individual too much
secondary gain.
Here we should note again the different ways in which
enhanced life expectancy might be achieved. Initially, rela-
tively short increases in life expectancy may result from the
treatments for particular diseases provided those diseases
occur in old age. In the longer term the interventions are
likely to be made more comprehensively in the embryo,
protecting against the onset of such diseases and more sub-
stantially enhancing life expectancy. In either case the inter-
ventions would be therapeutic in the traditional sense as well
as life extending. The impossibility of separating these two
functions or consequences of treatment will make it impossi-
ble to isolate the ethics of life extension and treat it as if it
had no further morally important consequences. Even if the
technology improves so that instead of accessing therapies for
diseases the side effect of which is life extension we develop
life-extending treatments that have the side effect of prevent-
ing disease, we will unlikely be able to reject one and not the
other effect.
If justice seems to demand some form of equalization of life
expectancy, we will have to face up to the deliberate curtailing
of lives that would otherwise continue with all of the addi-
tional moral problems that will entail. These will be discussed
further below.
We have become used to, in recent years, not only the idea
but also the reality of an increasingly aging population, but
it is doubtful that this phenomenon will have done much to
prepare us for the sorts of increases in life expectancy that
may be in store. The new immortals are not likely to be “old”
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Immortality as the side effect of therapy?
Global justice and social justice concerns may seem to make
the prospect of immortality seem unattractive. However, there
is another reason that makes it unclear that ethically anything
could be done to prevent the development and utilization
of techniques for substantially increasing longevity and even
engineering immortality. Remember that immortality is not
unconnected with preventing or curing a whole range of
serious diseases. It is one thing to ask whether we should
make people immortal and answer in the negative; quite
another to ask whether we should make people immune to
heart disease, cancer, dementia, and many other diseases and
decide that we shouldn’t, because a “side effect” of the treat-
ment would be an increase in life expectancy.We are then,
unlikely ever to face the question, Should we make people
immortal: Yes or no? We may rather be called upon to decide
whether we should treat this disease when we know an effec-
tive treatment will extend lifespan.
It might then be appropriate to think of immortality as the,
possibly unwanted, side effect of treating or preventing a
whole range of diseases. Could we really say to people, “You
must die at the age of 30 or 40 or 50, because the only way
we can cure you is to make you immortal or let you live to be
200 or 300”? Faced with such a choice an individual might
well say, “Let me have my three score and ten, and then let
me die.”Whether, given the quite pervasive and irrational
hostility to euthanasia, societies would be willing to allow
such bargains to be made is doubtful. However, the prospect
of denying people the introduction of effective therapies for
the diseases of old age on the grounds that old age would
thereby be abolished is equally difficult to contemplate.
Most probably it would be impossibly difficult to deny those
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population will remain negligible for many hundreds of years
after such therapies become available. The impact on particu-
lar societies might well be noticeable but again is likely to
remain insignificant for very long periods after the introduc-
tion of such technologies.We have already noted a possibly
increasing human vulnerability due to new infectious diseases
or antibiotic-resistant strains of bacteria. Again it is difficult
to predict the continuing effect of these on population or how
the advent of some immortals would affect the equation. Dis-
ease may well continue to be an effective leveler, improving its
own technology as we improve ours. And of course immortal
but vulnerable people will continue to die in accidents and
from injuries received, and the longer they live the greater is
the probability of accidental death.
One very general experience is that in all societies in which
life expectancy increases birth rate falls. The causes are hugely
complex, the most likely being the increase in average life
expectancy caused by a fall in infant mortality. One thing is
clear: We do not know the effect of the introduction of life-
extending therapies on population, partly because we don’t
know what else will happen or what else will have happened.
We do not therefore need to foreclose the possibility of pro-
viding life-extending treatments for fear of the effects on
population.We will need to consider effects as the therapies
come on stream and monitor the various consequences of
such therapies. If worst fears about the effect on population
seem likely to be realized, there are a number of obvious
strategies that might be adopted. One is a large “immortality
tax” payable by those who would access life-extending
therapies. Another would be to restrict the entitlement to
reproduce for those seeking immortality, either making
sterilization a condition of accessing the therapy or for those
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in conventional terms (frail, with restricted mobility and sus-
ceptible to the mental and physical infirmities we associate
with extreme old age). They may of course still have (rela-
tively) short periods of decrepitude toward the end of their
very long lives during which they will suffer from old-age
infirmities. But in this they will not be different from the
old to which we are used.We will not, however, be creating
longer periods of “old age.” Moreover, facing a long period of
life beyond conventional ages for retirement, both they and
the societies in which they live might find it inexpedient to
call on them to retire and forgo the income or the pension
contributions that would sustain their technologically
enhanced life expectancy. This brings us more generally to
the issue of population policy, but we will return to the issue
of global justice once some further necessary features of the
landscape have been explored.
Population Policy
Many people addressing the question of life extension have
assumed that such a possibility will have a disastrous effect
on the world’s population with the present generation living
indefinitely and a procession of subsequent generations
adding to the congestion.17 However, this is by no means
either a likely or even the most likely scenario. The effect of
life extension on population will be a function of a number of
different factors, the outcomes of which are all difficult to
predict. The first is the degree of uptake, which itself will be
heavily dependent on cost and availability of the therapies.
Granting, as we have, that life-extending therapies will grad-
ually become available, cost, risk, and uncertainty will mean
that for a very long time the numbers of people availing
themselves of such therapies will be a tiny proportion of the
world’s population. It is likely that the impact on world
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from now as we do to keep fast-acting poison away from our
contemporaries. But if we simply choose not to produce
future people there is no one who is harmed by this choice.
However, the argument for making sure that there will be
new generations is not settled by the outcome of the debate
between those who think that future lives count equally with
existing lives and those who do not. There are other reasons
why we should be in favor of the creation of new human indi-
viduals or, indeed, of a new kind of persons who may, if evo-
lution has not finally stopped, eventually evolve; or if it has,
who may be deliberately created by the germ-line modifica-
tion of human individuals.
One group of such reasons has to do with the desire to pro-
create and the pleasures of having and rearing children. These
I will not discuss further now, although in that they are fairly
universal desires and pleasures they have some importance.20
The second set of reasons has to do with the advantages of
fresh people, fresh ideas, and the possibility of continued
human development. If these reasons are powerful, and I
believe they are, and if the generational turnover proved too
slow for regeneration of youth and ideas, we might face a
future in which the fairest and the most ethical course might
be to contemplate a sort of “generational cleansing.”21 This
would involve deciding collectively how long it is reasonable
for people to live in each generation and trying to ensure that
as many as possible live healthy lives of that length.We would
then have to ensure that, having lived a “fair innings,” they
died at the appropriate time in order to make way for future
generations. Achieving this result by voluntary or ethical
means might be difficult; attitudes to suicide and euthanasia
might change but probably not overnight.
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who are “treated” as embryos, confining them to one child or
(if technology permits) making reversal of the life-extending
therapy a condition of procreation or excessive procreation.
One possible scenario is brilliantly described by Tom Kirk-
wood18 and involves surrendering immortality on the birth
of a second child.
The End of Reproduction
Of course these preventive strategies assume the necessity for,
or desirability of, the creation of future generations. Is there a
moral difference between a future that will contain x billion
people succeeded by another x billion different people and so
on indefinitely, or x billion people living indefinitely and
replacing themselves on the (rare?) occasions when they
are killed? Although, as we have noted, this is an unlikely
scenario, posing the question in this stark form enables us to
ask an important question. That question is whether or not
what matters morally is that life years of reasonable quality
exist or that different people with lives of reasonable quality
exist. Put in this way the problem assumes a familiar form—
should we maximize life years or individuals’ lives?19 From the
life years perspective it ought not to matter how many new
people the world will contain but simply how many life years
of acceptable quality it will contain. Those who, like me, find
the life years approach unsatisfactory will be inclined to think
that individual lives matter. But even so, it could consistently
be held that it is the individual lives of existing people that
matter, not how many new individual lives there will be. For,
if future generations will come into being, then we now have
responsibilities to those future people.We must not now do
things that will hurt future people when they come into
being.We have as much moral reason not to put slow-acting
poison into the water supply that will kill people 100 years
14 Intimations of Immortality: The Ethics and Justice of Life-ExtendingTherapies
a complete life, experience perhaps “the seven stages of man,”
have children and see them grow, and so on. If it is complete-
ness that matters, whether or not a life is complete will be a
question of fact in each case, and some lives will have their
moral importance discounted prematurely. To take a promi-
nent example, Nelson Mandela had had his fair innings (if
length of lifetime lived is the criterion) before leaving Victor
Verster prison, and had a fair innings been imposed, the long
march to freedom would never have been completed. The
conclusion is similar to that of the fair share version, namely,
that once a complete life has been lived one’s entitlement to
life is extinguished.
Now as the fair innings argument has been so far used in
health care it suggests that the entitlement to life-saving or
life-prolonging resources is extinguished once a fair innings
has been reached. It has never so far been used as an argu-
ment to justify direct killing. In the case of treatments that
would extend life indefinitely, however, the suggestion
must be not simply that health care following accidents
should be withheld but that the life-extending therapies
should themselves be time limited, if this proves technically
possible. This would mean that any entitlement to have one’s
life prolonged or even protected is extinguished after a given
quota of life.
In the case of life-extending therapies, the fair innings solu-
tion to the problem of immortality requires not simply that
people’s lives are not further sustained once a fair innings has
been achieved but rather we are asked to contemplate killing
those who have passed their sell-by date. If this is not done
only a few of the immortals will die when they “should,” only
those, in short, who require life-sustaining measures in order
to go on living. Even in the very science-fictional future case
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While, faced with a nonregenerating society, encouragement
of suicide and euthanasia might seem increasingly attractive,
it is difficult to imagine how it could be justified, at least if
our time-honored ethical principles remain plausible. For how
could a society resolve to deliberately curtail worthwhile life
while maintaining a commitment to the sanctity of life?
The Reintroduction of a Fair Innings
If we cannot see our way clear to modifying our conception of
the sanctity of life, there are other strategies open. For exam-
ple, we might, if we could, do something that amounts to the
same thing, namely program cells to switch off the aging
process for a certain time (number of cell divisions or what-
ever) and then switch it back on again when a “fair innings”
had been reached. This of course would be much like the sys-
tem nature has in place, with the important difference that
most people would live a full life or an enhanced lifespan
rather than having to run the gauntlet of the genetic lottery.
Here the so-called fair innings argument is resurrected in a
new form. Now, this argument has many difficulties, despite
superficial attractiveness, and many notable adherents.22
There are two classic versions of the fair innings argument.
The fair innings argument says either that there is a period of
lifetime that is either a fair share of life or a period sufficient
to live a complete life. Let’s imagine that in each case the
suggested span is the familiar “three score and ten,” or 70
years. The “fair share” version says that 70 years is a fair
allocation of life and that people should be supported in
their attempts or desires to live up to 70 years, but after that
threshold is reached they should be considered to have had
their fair share of life. The “complete life” version suggests
that a certain period of existence is required in order to live
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But for most people life is surely not like that and, for that
matter, conceptions of the value, purpose, or point of life
are not like that.23 I will not here attempt to set out the vari-
ous leading conceptions of the value, purpose, or point of
existence. I will rest content with observing that most people
do not see their life as essentially bounded by a particular
finishing line nor, even if they do see it as an enterprise,
which they are trying to shape and direct, do they see it as
of a shape and form fixed in advance. They are more likely
to see it as a constantly changing entity like a hamlet that
grows into a town and then into a city and may begin to
shrink again with different houses and districts constantly
evolving and being replaced. Although fair innings concep-
tions of life may help with problems or scarcity, they do
scant justice to the ways (most) people feel about their lives.
Apart from convenience it is difficult to see how fair innings
conceptions of the value of life or the entitlement to live
could be imposed on those who don’t accept them when
such imposition means premature death, or what would be
considered to be premature death, by those who do not share
such a view.
Is Longevity a Good?
This brings us to the central issue: Would substantially
increased life expectancy or even immortality be in fact a
benefit or a good? There are people who regard the prospect
of immortality with distaste or even horror; there are others
who desire it above all else. In that most people fear death
and want to postpone it as long as possible, there is some rea-
son to suppose that the prospect of personal immortality
would be widely welcomed. But it is one thing to contemplate
our own personal immortality, quite another to contemplate a
world in which increasing numbers of people were immortal,
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where we might be able to switch off the aging process in
cells of an embryo but program the aging to switch on again
in, say, 1,000 years, we would be contemplating direct killing.
This would be the equivalent of putting a delayed action poi-
son into someone’s body that would cause death at some
given moment in the future.
The contemplation of the direct killing of people who wish to
go on living is terrible indeed.Without this we must either
abjure therapies that will cure or prevent the many terrible
illnesses that cause premature death but only at the cost of
extending life or find other ways of providing the therapies
while avoiding the consequent increased lifespan.
The case of life-extending therapies draws attention to a
problem about fair innings approaches to health care, and
for that matter to other social welfare measures and indeed
entitlements to community services more generally. It is
that they beg the question as to where the value of life or the
entitlement to life is located in a particular way. Fair innings
approaches say that the right to life or the value of life is an
entitlement grounded on life’s value both consisting in and
being exhausted by life having a particular size or shape. The
value or purpose of life is to achieve that size or shape and
once achieved the value is extinguished. It is like seeing the
purpose of life as getting to the finishing line set arbitrarily at
a particular point. If the runner continues beyond the finish-
ing line, that is a pointless and wasteful activity viewed from
the perspective of the point and purpose of the race. Or if
shape is the issue life is viewed like the construction of a
building according to the plans of a master architect. Once
the realization of those plans is complete, then any further
additions or modifications are destructive of that original
conception and are self-defeating.
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would be perfectly normal and natural. Could we curtail their
“natural” lifespan? Suppose, as Tom Kirkwood suggests,24 that
aging is neither inevitable nor necessary. It might then be true
that mortality would rightly be considered an unnatural aber-
ration, and immortality might in fact be the fair innings.
Would our attitude be different? Would it make a scrap of
moral difference? Perhaps we should think of life-extending
therapies as the equivalent of the administration of folic acid
in pregnancy.We do not think of children thus advantaged as
having benefited from some unfair advantage. If it is not
plausible to think of the advantages of folic acid or alcohol
avoidance in pregnancy as unfair, why would we think of life
extension performed to benefit children as an advantage that
could be or should be rectified?
If life extension counts as life saving, then, unless we can find
valid grounds to distinguish between lives, it would be
mandatory, and we should do it for others if we can, both as
individuals and as society; and where we can’t afford to do it
for all we should do it for as many as we can (fairly selected).
If people wish to pay for it for themselves rather than wait on
publicly funded measures, this would surely be unexception-
able. If on the other hand it is a luxury, like life beyond the
fair innings, then there is no obligation to provide it, but what
objection could there be to people providing their own luxury
at their own expense?
III. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF IMMORTALITY
We must now consider some of the arguments that have been
adduced suggesting that whether or not immortality is ethical
or desirable it is impossible, not because science might not
eventually make our physical bodies indefinitely long-lived
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and in which we and all or any future children would have to
compete indefinitely with previous generations for jobs, space,
and everything else. In order to understand what one might
mean by the question “Is longevity a good?” we must consider
the meaning of life extension or the postponement of death.
And considering this question will help to clarify the require-
ments of distributive justice.
Just Distribution of Opportunities for Extended Life
If, as seems probable, life-extending therapies are both
inevitable and morally defensible, how might we approach
questions of individual and global justice in the distribution
of such opportunities for extended life? Firstly we should
consider whether just distribution of life extension differs
from questions of just access to more familiar death-
postponing therapies. It surely comes down to this: Either
life-extending therapies are life saving or they are not, “life
saving” being always simply a redescription (and usually a
less precise description) of “death postponing.” Or life-
extending treatments are to be considered not as life saving
but as something less urgent and important, some sort of
bonus, like a luxury car perhaps. The fair innings argument
seems to imply this. But how could it be simply that? How
could extinguishing a life that is valuable to the person whose
life it is be simply like declining to fund a luxury car?
Suppose life extension happened by accident.Would it be
ethical to curtail an accidentally extended life because it held
out prospects attractive beyond the norm? Could we do this
for any other accidentally achieved advantages? Could we kill
the beneficiary of life extension once he had passed his sell-by
date? Suppose by intervention in the germ line we could
effect immortalization so that new children would be genetic
immortals. They would inherit immortality, and for them it
20 Intimations of Immortality: The Ethics and Justice of Life-ExtendingTherapies
Successive Selves and Rational Prudence
It has been suggested that over a very long life of a Methuse-
lah, personal identity must fail, giving place to successive
selves, and that it follows that prudential or self-interested
motivation for continued existence must also therefore fail.27
Suppose Methuselah has three identities, A, B, and C, and
that C can remember nothing of A’s life. But suppose the fol-
lowing is also true: A will want to be B, who will remember
being A; B will want to become C, who will remember being
B but possibly not remember being A. It is not irrational for
A to want to be B and not irrational for A to want to be B
partly because he or she knows that B will be able to look
forward to being C, even though by the time she is C she
won’t remember being A.Thus even if personal identity in
some strict sense fails over time it is not clear that a suffi-
ciently powerful motivation for physical longevity fails with
personal identity. This would remain true however many
selves Methuselah turns out to be.
To take a different example: I can have powerful personal
interest in the survival of my children and grandchildren
although their identities are different from mine. I know
these are successive and different selves, but I have an interest
in their existence, and in their well-being throughout that
existence.28 No argument has or could show the irrationality
of wishing to be Methuselah even if Methuselah is a succes-
sion of selves and not a single personal identity. It would, of
course, show that it was not personal survival that is at issue
in such a case, but it could not show the irrationality of even
a very strong and passionate interest in the existence of those
future beings. So that when it is said that “there would not
be good reasons to care about the future selves”29 in such
circumstances, this is surely disingenuous. This is no more
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but that the persons whose bodies they initially were would
survive less successfully than their immortal coils.
TheArgument from Successive Selves
The first such argument is about psychological discontinuity.25
This argument suggests that problems with psychological
discontinuity would result in successive selves rather than one
very long-lived self. This suggestion has much philosophical
respectability but has never been overwhelmingly convincing.
The main support for it comes in the form of suggestions that
without continuity of memory, continuity of personality and
hence personal identity fail, or that it is impossible for the
brain to integrate memory over very long periods because of
its apparent need to suppress trivial memories. Suppose I have
no memories earlier than age 5. Does it follow that my physi-
cal body is 5 years older than me? Secondly, even if scientific
claims about the impossibility of the brain integrating memory
and the need to suppress trivial memories are plausible, it
doesn’t follow that the long-lived individual could not supple-
ment physiological memory with supplementary data of
many sorts that would provide the appropriate backup. Video
histories, photos, records of various kinds could remind even
Methuselah of his earlier life even when physiological memory
fails, and other Methuselahs could reminisce with him and fill
in enough of the gaps.When I look at a photograph of myself
at age 3 playing with a long-forgotten toy, I smile both in
recognition of myself, age 3, and begin to remember that
favorite toy. Of course I don’t know whether or not my
memory is partly determined by the photograph—but still
I remember it in a sense.26 Whether or not that “memory” is
veridical is probably impossible to determine, but its role in
giving coherence and continuity to existence does not depend
on the memory being apodictic.
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Immortality is cost-effective
Before we leave the issue of temporal discounting we should
consider the possibility, pointed out to me by Søren Holm,32
that immortality so far from increasing health costs per indi-
vidual might actually dramatically reduce them, there might
in short be an economic discounting argument for the public
funding of immortality interventions.
If we assume the following:
1. For both mortals and immortals there is the same period
of old age with increased health care costs (say ten years,
but the length does not matter for the argument) and the
same costs of treatment during those years (let’s say
£10,000 [$20,137] on average).
2. The mortals will reach this period in 70 years and the
immortals in 1,000 years.
3. There is a 1 percent per year rate of real economic growth.
Then the present day discounted costs of treating a person in
70 years’ time will be £4,948 ($9,960), whereas the present
day cost of treating the same person in 1,000 years’ time will
be 43 pence ($.87)! It thus makes economic good sense to
invest now and postpone health care costs from 70 years into
the future to 1,000 years into the future, and, as is evident
from the figures, it makes sense even if immortals would have
a much longer and more costly old age (because of the dis-
counting, even a tenfold increase in costs would not matter).33
Add to this the probability that a greater number of immor-
tals would die as the result of accidents rather than long
drawn-out illnesses and the economic arguments grow
stronger still.
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true than it is true that I have no good reasons to care about
my great great grandchildren. It is only irrational (possibly)
to think that this will be the self, surviving indefinitely, but
it is not irrational to have an interest in creating those succes-
sive selves. Therefore, as an argument for the foolishness
or psychological incoherence of bodily immortality, the
argument fails.
Temporal discounting
Many people think that it is rational to discount the far
future in favor of the present or near future, and that this
shows that we cannot have an interest in ourselves far into
the future. Even if this were true it would not follow that
discounting events in the far future in favor of the near future
entailed that the far future count for nothing.30 Suppose we
had to choose between five days of pain now or five months
of pain in 1,000 years’ time, it would not be irrational to
choose to put off the pain for 1,000 years and that is probably
what we would in fact do; that would not show that we had
no interest in our future selves, it would merely demonstrate
a recognition that there are other reasons why that future
event may never occur, which makes it rational to go for post-
ponement even at increased eventual cost. As Derek Parfit
has noted, “It may often be morally permissible to be less
concerned about the more remote effects of our social poli-
cies. But this would never be because these effects are more
remote.… Most of our fellow citizens live closer to us than
most aliens. But no one suggests that, because there are such
correlations, we should adopt a Spatial Discount Rate. No
one thinks that we would be morally justified if we cared less
about the long-range effects of our acts, at some rate of n per-
cent per yard. The Temporal Discount rate is, I believe, as
little justified.”31
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the future would be bleak and uninteresting is impossible to
say. But since immortals would still be vulnerable, they would
always have a way out if and when endless repetition became
inevitable and unwelcome.
IV. THEVIRTUES OF MORTALITY
A number of writers have been forthright in extolling the
virtues of mortality.We have already noticed some of these.
Prominent among recent contributors to this debate has been
Leon Kass, appointed by George W. Bush in 2001 to head up
his new President’s Council on Bioethics. Kass identifies the
core question as the following: “Is it really true that longer
life for individuals is an unqualified good?” Kass gives four
main reasons why we should not only think that it is not an
unqualified good but rather that we should think of it as an
evil. He starts however with a metaphysical observation. “For
to argue that human life would be better without death is, I
submit, to argue that human life would be better being some-
thing other than human. The new immortals, in the decisive
sense, would not be like us at all. If this is true, a human
choice for bodily immortality would suffer from the deep
confusion of choosing to have some great good only on con-
dition of turning into someone else.”36 This is close to Glan-
non’s argument about personal identity and, insofar as it relies
on claims about psychological continuity over time, it has the
problems we have already considered. However, Kass’s argu-
ment seems to be suggesting a simpler objection: that since
the (current) essence of being human is to be mortal, immor-
tals would necessarily be a different type of being and there-
fore have a different identity. There is a sense in which this is
true, but not I think in any sense in which it would be irra-
tional to want to change identity to the specified extent. It
would still be “me” in a new persona that would live longer
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So far we have not challenged the assumption that it might
indeed be both impossible for memory to permit a single self
to survive over, say, 800 to 900 years and that an immortal
body would therefore play host to successive mortal souls. I
have suggested that even if this were true it would not be irra-
tional to wish to be the first and possibly the second in such a
series of selves and to wish the subsequent, successive selves
long and happy continuance.34 I could take as much if not
more pride and interest in my “line” of genetically identical
and bodily (spatio-temporally) continuous selves as many do
in their “line” of descendents. However, I am far from con-
vinced that I cannot have my cake and eat it, or rather have
my descendents and be them, too.
Is being 42 boring?
Is there a limit to the number of projects that can sustain our
interest in persisting as persons into the future? It has been
suggested that there is, and that this is due to the limit in our
cognitive resources of knowledge and imagination.
Bernard Williams35 has famously argued along these lines.
Williams suggests that even “frozen” at an ideal age of 42, one
would eventually have done all that 42-year-olds can do and
so become terminally bored. But that presupposes that all that
42-year-olds can do is all that 42-year-olds could do in, say,
1973. Since the 42-year-olds will live forever, they will be for-
ever able to increase the ambit of even 42-year-old imagina-
tion. One might adapt the, probably apocryphal, story about
Jane Fonda.When someone flatteringly told her that she
didn’t look “40,” she allegedly responded, “Come on, this is
the seventies—this is what 40 looks like now.”We might say,
“Come on, Bernard, this is immortality, this is what 40-year-
old immortals can find to do!”Whether eventually an immor-
tal would have done everything possible so many times that
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2. Seriousness and aspiration
“Could life be serious or meaningful without the limit of
mortality? asks Kass, obviously expecting “no” as the answer.
He has little to offer us by way of evidence or argument. He
says “to number our days is the condition for making them
count,” and the Psalmist is cited as authority. Then we get
treated to the biography of some nonexistent beings—Zeus,
Hera, Apollo, and Athena—who apparently lead frivolous
lives on account of their fictional immortality. Interestingly,
Kass does not wax eloquent upon the frivolity and vacuous-
ness of the existence of the immortal Almighty. This may be
because God, having an existence quite unlike our own and
(necessarily?) beyond our ken, is better at finding meaning in
existence than we are. But it is unclear why this should be so;
if it were the limit that confers meaning, then God would
seem also to need limits.
3. Beauty and love
Here things go from bad to worse. Kass quotes Wallace
Stevens as saying, “Death is the mother of beauty,” and then
Kass struggles unsuccessfully for two whole paragraphs to
make sense of the quotation, producing only a procession of
rhetorical questions. His last is “How deeply could one death-
less ‘human’ love another?” I imagine one plausible answer
might be “as deeply as any mortal but with the distinctly
romantic advantage that they could be lovers for eternity.”
4.Virtue andmoral excellence
Here Kass makes two points: that virtue and moral excellence
require (sometimes?) the willingness to give one’s time, and
perhaps one’s life, for good causes, “spending the precious
coinage of the time of our lives.” Of course this coinage will
still be precious even for immortals—one will simply have
more spending power and hence more opportunity to do
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than before. Someone who had been profoundly disabled
from birth (blind or crippled) and for whom a cure became
available in midlife would become in a sense a different per-
son. She would lead a different type of life in many decisive
ways. It does not follow that the blind or crippled individual
has no rational motive to be cured because she would then, in
an important sense, be a different individual. Or take the case
of a transsexual; gender is a deep issue of identity, but there is
no “deep confusion” in imagining that someone born as a man
would wish to change sex and become a woman. Certainly it
would be odd to say to him, as Kass presumably would have
us do, “It is deeply confused to want to change sex because
then you will no longer exist.” He knows very well that he
will continue to exist, but as a woman, and he hopes that the
change will make him happier. It may not, of course, but we
surely know who it is who will still be miserable.37
Kass then offers his four benefits of mortality, and we will
look at them in turn.
1. Interest and engagement
“If the human lifespan were increased even by 20 years, would
the pleasures of life increase proportionately? Would profes-
sional tennis players really enjoy playing 25 percent more
games of tennis? Would Don Juans … feel better for having
seduced 1,250 women rather than 1,000? What would there
be to do for 15 years after being president of Harvard for a
quarter of a century?” Unlike Kass I think I can see differ-
ences in the degree of reward between enjoying 250 more
women or 15 more years at Harvard. Be that as it may, the
sensible answer is surely “if more of the same does not appeal,
there is always the opportunity to try something different”;
that is, of course, always providing that one has world enough
and time in which to do it.
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impact on procreation undetectable. For the foreseeable future
there will always be the fresh eyes and minds that both Kass
and I think are desirable. It does not follow of course that
everyone must “open themselves to procreation,”40 and I
am sure Kass doesn’t believe that those who cannot have
children or those who choose not to have children, let alone
for celibate religious orders, are entirely lacking in any
“higher purpose.”
Immortality and Reproduction
Let’s look further at the perhaps superficially tempting way of
dealing both with some of the inequities of producing and
of formulating an appropriate population policy for immortals
by attempting to deny them the right to reproduce, except
perhaps posthumously or on condition that they sacrifice
their immortality. The justification for this draconian measure
would be that the immortal was occupying the space and
resources needed for future generations and therefore could
not herself create such generations without releasing the
appropriate resources and space. This might, as we have seen,
involve denying the chance of reproduction to immortals or
severely limiting it. The next problem is that reproductive lib-
erty is a powerful and widely accepted right protected by the
major international conventions on human rights.41 Of course
a society of immortals might never have attached such impor-
tance to procreation, and so the international conventions
might have been or might come to be very different.42
The second set of problems concern what is sometimes erro-
neously thought of as the interests of the child but is more
appropriately addressed as the question of what sorts of con-
ditions are best for children and the question of the extent to
which we are entitled to try to ensure optimum conditions for
children. Certainly it is far from optimum for children to be
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good. And of course, as we have already noted, our vulnerabil-
ity will remain so that it will still be possible to “give our
lives” if necessary. Kass ends his thoughts with this resonant
but vacuous passage: “Yet for this nobility, vulnerability and
mortality are the necessary conditions. The immortals cannot
be noble.” Here the gloss he offers on “nobility” is “doing vir-
tuous deeds,” and of course these can still be done and, as I
have indicated, in greater quantity. And as for the ultimate
sacrifice, arguably it would be nobler since one would be
giving up infinite rather than simply finite possibilities.
Kass’s final fling is to suggest that “simply to covet a pro-
longed lifespan for ourselves is both a sign and a cause of our
failure to open ourselves to procreation and to any higher
purpose. It is also an expression of a childish and narcissistic
wish incompatible with devotion to posterity.… It seeks an
endless present, isolated from anything truly eternal, and sev-
ered from any true continuity with past and future.” If there
is a sure sign of failure of nerve in argument it is when the
words true and truly are introduced to qualify one’s own posi-
tion. The issue of future generations as well as an eternal
present is interesting and important.We have already looked
at some of the issues concerning the impact of immortality on
procreation. I have no doubt that new generations are impor-
tant and that it is highly desirable that procreation continue.
And not just procreation rather abstractly conceived but also
parenting and having children.38 But it is a long way from this
to say that everyone must procreate or have children. As we
have noted, one approach to the possibility of personal
immortality might be to make the forgoing or limiting of
procreation a price to be paid for personal immortality.39 But
this is likely to be a long-term “solution,” for in the short term
the numbers of individuals able to access life-prolonging
technology will be in global terms so small as to make the
30 Intimations of Immortality: The Ethics and Justice of Life-ExtendingTherapies
Health Costs
One last rather draconian way of attempting to inhibit the
would-be immortals might be to insist that they bear all of
their health costs after a fair innings or currently normal
lifespan had elapsed. However, it is not clear whether the
therapeutic advantages of vastly increased life expectancy
would reduce or increase overall health costs for affected indi-
viduals. For although people might live vastly longer lives,
they would certainly be on average more healthy throughout
their lives and might have much shorter periods of health care
dependency at the end of life. And we have already noted the
positive effect of investing early and getting the benefit of
economic discounting to offset the costs of health care late
in life. Thus despite the greater “opportunity” to consume
public resources the actual consumption might be reduced for
immortals, and therefore economic arguments for penalizing
such individuals might well fail. However, even if the reverse
were true, it is not clear that it would be justifiable to distin-
guish between older and younger citizens in terms of the
rights of access to health care.43
V. IMMORTALITY ISTHE RIGHT TOAN
OPEN FUTURE
Joel Feinberg has elaborated what he calls “the right to an
open future” in the context of child protection.44 Such a right
is a right held “in trust” for a child to exercise when he or she
has the competence that makes the right relevant. This is how
Feinberg explains the right:
When sophisticated autonomy rights are attributed to chil-
dren who are clearly not yet capable of exercising them,
their names refer to rights that are to be saved for the child
until he is an adult but which can be violated “in advance,”
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born after the death of their parents.Would it be good for the
children if mortals produced immortal children or if immortal
parents produced mortal children? The answers to these ques-
tions are beyond the purview of this paper, but it is important
to note that they raise significant issues.
Immortality and “Voluntary” Risk
In the spirit of justice some might think it appropriate to vol-
unteer the immortal for especially risky occupations, perhaps
once they had passed a normal lifespan of three score and ten.
One effect of this might be to reduce their chances of living
to enjoy immortality, and more of them than would otherwise
be the case, resulting in a lifespan profile more like that of the
generality of individuals. Despite the malicious, if superficial,
attractiveness of such a scheme, it seems to involve two prob-
ably fatal difficulties. The first is that it is difficult to see how
it would be ethically or indeed legally acceptable to coerce
immortals into dangerous employment. Even if it had been
made a condition of the conferment of immortality in the
first place it is difficult to see how it could be acceptably
enforced. Moreover, if immortality had been engineered into
embryos or gametes prior to conception, it would be prob-
lematic to regard any such condition as binding on the
emerging individual once they had become competent.
If the condition were nonetheless imposed, the effect might
be less than satisfying. Since the immortals are likely to be
among the richer and more influential sector of the commu-
nity (having purchased their immortality or having had it
purchased on their behalf ), the effect might be to ensure
that the risky nature of the occupation were reduced rather
than that accidental mortality among the immortals were
increased. This might be one of the advantages of such a
policy on risk and immortality.
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future might well require parents to give their children the
option of immortality in order to ensure for their child that
such a “key option will not already be closed to him” when he
reaches maturity. To be sure Feinberg had in mind a range of
options that would present themselves “simultaneously,” so to
speak, to individuals on reaching maturity, like a number of
different doors on different possible futures between which to
choose. However, extended lifespan will principally present
options sequentially rather than simultaneously to future
individuals. Even allowing for some discounting of future
options they are nonetheless real options, and when (and if )
the future becomes less problematic the discounting may
seem less psychologically appealing and its absence of logic
more obvious.
This raises the very interesting and vexing question of the
extent and nature of parental duties to children.Whether
parental obligations to children include trying to extend their
life expectancy and how binding or enforceable such obliga-
tions might be is of great interest and complexity. Could the
obligation to provide life-extending treatments to the embryo
be greater or less than the obligation of mothers to take folic
acid during pregnancy or to avoid smoking?48
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so to speak, before the child is even in a position to exercise
them.The violating conduct guarantees now that when
the child is an autonomous adult, certain key options will
already be closed to him. His right while he is still a child
is to have these future options kept open until he is a fully
formed, self-determining adult capable of deciding
among them.
And Feinberg concludes that all rights-in-trust of this sort
“can be summed up as the single ‘right to an open future.’ ”
Later in his essay Feinberg cites with approval a seminal court
ruling that outlines the relevant principle encapsulating the
right to an open future, confirming in Feinberg’s words that
children must be “permitted to reach maturity with as many
open options, opportunities, and advantages as possible.”45
The judgment comes from the 1944 case of Prince v. Massa-
chusetts in the United States Supreme Court.46
The healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into
full maturity as citizens with all that implies [in a democ-
racy] … Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves.
But it does not follow that they are free in identical circum-
stances to make martyrs of their children before they have
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can
make that decision for themselves.47
This case involved the children of Jehovah’s Witnesses who
distributed religious tracts on the streets, and while Feinberg
notes that the principle was probably misapplied in this case
he clearly endorses its substance. Clearly, Feinberg was not
addressing himself to the issue of life-prolonging interven-
tions. But a real question arises here, for if, as seems likely, the
most successful and enduring life-enhancing modifications
would have to be made on the embryo, the right to an open
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productivity, creativity, and many other human activities.
Without going into detail my own view is that there are rea-
sons for thinking longevity may have many different and
often incompatible effects on all of these things, some benefi-
cial and others not.
To come down to earth, there is no doubt that immortality
would be a mixed blessing, but we should be slow to reject
cures for terrible diseases even if the price we have to pay for
those cures is increasing life expectancy and even creating
immortals. Better surely to accompany the scientific race to
achieve immortality with commensurate work in ethics and
social policy to ensure that we know how to cope with the
transition to parallel populations of mortals and immortals as
envisaged in mythology. As and when the numerical balance
of these parallel populations seems set to shift dramatically
toward significant and problematic numbers of immortals,
some hard decisions will have to be taken. Eventually if
justice can be done, and if we resolve the issue of an appropri-
ate balance between existing and new generations, we will
have also seen the emergence of a replacement species and
will have passed from a world of mortals to, what would
it be—demigods?
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CONCLUSION
For the first time in human history we face the prospect of a
truly open future, involving sequential as well as simultaneous
opportunities and stretching open-ended before the individ-
ual in an unprecedented but truly liberating pathway to the
vanishing point … and beyond.
It is interesting to speculate on the long-term impact of
long-term life on our cherished institutions. One possible
consequence49 of writing immortality into the genes of the
human race might be the final extinction of religion. The
promise of the afterlife, highly conditional in most religions,
could be indefinitely postponed.Why take even a small gam-
ble on the conditions being fulfilled in one’s own case when
the point of fulfilling them had been substantially eroded?
Likewise the threat of the afterlife, usually much more
unequivocal than the promise, would lose its sting, only the
careless having to face the prospect of confrontation with a,
by then, terminally bored deity. Fears that dwindling influ-
ence would provoke the deity into more frequent and more
than usually disastrous interventions in human affairs might
be a consideration for some, but if such interventions failed to
materialize or were of doubtful provenance it seems unlikely
that religion would survive. Just how comforting or how lib-
erating this outcome might be only time would tell. Another
interesting conundrum would be the effect on politics in gen-
eral and the political process in particular. One accepted
cliché is that people become more conservative as they get
older. However, if the radical spirit of youth is connected with
a long future stretching before the young we might expect a
resurgence of radicalism from the immortals. Obviously these
are unanswerable questions, as are questions about the effect
of longevity on crime rates, divorce rates, sexual activity
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